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RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S LAW № 87-ФЗ: 
POLITICAL MACHINATION OR 
PROCEDURAL REFORM? 
 
Kirill Ershov* 
ABSTRACT: Law 87-ФЗ was signed by Russian President 
Vladimir Putin six months prior to the December 2007 
presidential election.  Law 87-Ф3 rearranged the division of 
functions between the investigator and the procurator during 
the preliminary investigation. It also saw the creation of the 
investigative committee within the procuracy, which would have 
exclusive supervision of all investigations within that branch.  
Because of the Committee’s personal jurisdiction over 
investigations involving individuals with official immunity and 
agents of Russia’s power structures, both Russian media and 
Western academia saw the law as being politically motivated by 
the upcoming transfer of power.  The new law is seen as a 
further step in Russia’s transition away from a Soviet 
procurator-centered criminal procedure system and toward a 
judicial oversight model consistent with adversarial principles.   
This paper examines the political rationalizations for law 87-
Ф3 reforms and points out the flaws.  While not denying the 
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validity of these justifications, this paper posits that such 
explanations are unverifiable.  The paper concludes by 
providing procedural justifications for law 87-Ф3. 
INTRODUCTION 
Six months prior to the December 2007 Russian election, 
which would legitimize Dmitri Medvedev, Vladimir Putin’s heir 
apparent, as the President of the Russian Federation, the 
Russian Legislature passed law “From 6.5.2007 No. 87-Ф3” 
(hereinafter “law 87-Ф3”).  Signed by Putin on June 5, 2007, 
the law was due to take full effect in ninety days.1  Law 87-Ф3 
rearranged the division of functions between the investigator 
and the procurator during the preliminary investigatory stage 
of a prosecution.  It also created the investigative committee 
within the procuracy and gave the committee exclusive 
supervision of all investigations within that branch.  Because of 
the committee’s personal jurisdiction over investigations 
involving individuals with official immunity and agents of 
Russia’s power structures, both Russian media and Western 
academia saw the law as being politically motivated by the 
upcoming transfer of power. 
After a brief description of the preliminary investigation as 
implemented in Russia, this paper examines the political 
rationalizations for law 87-Ф3 reforms and points out the 
flaws.  While not denying validity of the law’s rationalizations, 
this paper posits that such explanations are unverifiable and 
provides procedural justifications for law 87-Ф3.  In its 
rearrangement of the procurator’s relationship with the 
preliminary investigation, law 87-Ф3 is seen as a further step 
in Russia’s transition away from a Soviet procurator-centered 
criminal procedure system and toward a judicial oversight 
model consistent with adversarial principles. 
  * Esquire; Clerk, Capital Habeas Unit, Federal Public Defender for the 
Central District of California; J.D. UCLA School of Law, 2009; B.A. Univ. of 
California Berkeley, 2001. For comments and criticism, please contact me at 
kirill.g.ershov@gmail.com.  
 1 Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian 
Federation Collection of Legislation] 2007, No. 87, Item 3, available at 
http://www.consultant.ru/online/base/?req=doc;base=LAW;n=38313;p=2. 
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THE 2001 CODE 
The modern role of the procurator in the Russian 
Federation still retains some of the Soviet conception of the 
procurator’s judicial functions.  The Soviet system was centered 
on the procurator as the guarantor of observance of citizens’ 
rights during the judicial process: “[S]upervision over the exact 
execution of the laws of the USSR, the RSFSR [Soviet Republic 
of Russia], and autonomous republics in criminal proceedings 
shall be exercised by the USSR procurator general both directly 
and through the RSFSR procurator and other procurators 
subordinate to him.”2  This approach has been deemed the 
“procuracy supervision” in order to contrast it with the “judicial 
oversight” model of Western systems.3 
In terms of an inquisitorial or continental model of 
criminal procedure, the preliminary investigation is the stage 
which precedes the trial and during which all evidence to be 
used against the accused is gathered.4  Under procuracy 
supervision, the procurator was seen as the final arbiter in the 
realm of preliminary investigation.  The procurator had the 
power to vacate a criminal case,5 along with the final authority 
over a suspect’s pre-trial detention6 and over the legality of 
searches and seizures:7  “Appeals from actions of an agency of 
inquiry or an investigator shall be made to a procurator8 [and] 
[a]ppeals from actions and decisions of a procurator shall be 
 2 Ugolovno-Protsessual’nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedure Code] 
art. 25 (Russ.), reprinted in HAROLD J. BERMAN, RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER 
STUDIES, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES (Harold J. 
Berman & James W. Spindler trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed.1972).  This 
conception of the procurator was inherited from Tsarist Russia.  See 
Jonathan Greenberg, The Kremlin’s Eye: The 21st Century Prokuratura in the 
Russian Authoritarian Tradition, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2009). 
 3 A. Khaliulin & V. Nazarenko, From Procuracy Supervision to Judicial 
Oversight, in 41 STATUTES AND DECISIONS 31 (2005). 
 4 See A. SMIRNOV & K. KALINOVSKI, UGOLOVNI PROCESS, [THE CRIMINAL 
PROCESS] 346 (2008). 
 5 UPK art. 116. 
 6 William Burnham & Jeffrey Kahn, Russia’s Criminal Procedure Code 
Five Years Out, 33 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 1, § 2.2 (2008) (citing UPK arts. 2, 
89, 96, 97). 
 7 UPK arts. 167, 168, 218-20. 
 8 Id. art. 218. 
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brought to a higher procurator.”9  Even during the trial phase, 
the procurator often had the final word over procedural legality 
because the trial courts’ exercise of authority frequently 
consisted of rubberstamping procuratorial decisions.10 
Judicial oversight first entered Russian procedure after the 
Soviet collapse, when the Constitutional Court extended 
supervisory power over preliminary investigations to the 
courts.11  In 1993, the new Russian Constitution declared that 
“judicial proceedings shall be conducted based on adversarial 
principles and equality of the parties.”12  In 1999 the 
Constitutional Court found the Constitution as granting 
individuals a right to appeal state preliminary investigation 
actions that substantially restricted their rights and freedoms.  
Then in 2001, with the passing of the Criminal Procedure Code 
of the Russian Federation (“the 2001 Code”), the legislature 
adopted judicial oversight principles directly into the Code of 
Criminal Procedure.  In addition to courts expanding their 
jurisdiction to hear appeals, the courts were required to 
authorize key state actions during the preliminary 
investigation, such as preliminary detentions and searches and 
seizures.13 
Although the new Criminal Procedure Code’s reforms took 
away the procurator’s final word over the legality of 
investigative actions, these reforms also worked to consolidate 
the procurator’s powers over the investigative process from the 
perspective of the state.  Specifically, procurators were given 
more powers over the actions of investigators in that a criminal 
case could no longer be opened without an approval of the 
 9 Id. art. 220. 
 10 Stephen C. Thaman, The Nullification of the Russian Jury: Lessons for 
Jury-Inspired Reform in Eurasia and Beyond, 40 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 355, 357 
(2007). 
 11 Khaliulin & Nazarenko, supra note 3, at 31. 
 12 Burnham & Kahn, supra note 6, § 2.2 (citing Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 123(3)). 
 13 Authorizations are required for detentions exceeding forty-eight hours 
and for searches of residences and of individuals, when not incident to arrest.  
For detentions, see Burnham & Kahn, supra note 6, at 11 (citing Ugolovno-
Protsessual’nyi Kodeks [UPK] [Criminal Procedure Code] art. 10[1] (Russ.)).  
For searches and seizures, see id. at 46 (citing UPK art. 29[2]).  For 
discussion on appeals, see Khaliulin & Nazarenko, supra note 3, at 32 (citing 
UPK art. 125). 
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procurator.14  Following a procurator’s consent, the preliminary 
investigation was to be conducted as directed by the 
procurator.15  A procurator’s consent was also required prior to 
an investigator’s petition to the court for a court-authorized 
search and seizure and pre-trial detention authorizations.16  
Consequently, the 2001 Code’s break with the Soviet model 
can be seen as taking away most of the procurator’s power over 
the determination of the legality of the preliminary 
investigation and replacing it with the responsibility for that 
legality from the perspective of the state. 
INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION 
In Russia the concept of investigative subject matter 
jurisdiction governs which investigative agency has jurisdiction 
over which type of crime.17  This concept is analogous to the 
divisions in jurisdictions of various federal investigative 
agencies in the United States, such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). 
The majority of preliminary investigations are handled by 
investigators of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) which is 
commonly referred to as Militsia.18  Militsia investigators 
handle crimes such as burglary,19 theft, fraud, and 
racketeering as related to organized crime,20 money 
laundering,21 sale or purchase of illegally obtained goods,22 and 
receiving 
Two other notable investigative agencies are the Federal 
Security Service (FSB) and the Federal Drug Control Service 
(FSKN).  FSB is the successor to the Soviet KGB (Komitet 
 14 Burnham & Kahn, supra note 6, § 2.2 (citing UPK art. 146). 
 15 UPK art. 146. 
 16 See UPK art. 37. 
 17 See SMIRNOV & KALINOVSKI, supra note 4, at 356-60; see also UPK art. 
151. 
 18 Id. at 357. 
 19 Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] art. 151 (Russ.). 
 20 Id. arts. 158, 151,163. 
 21 Id. art. 174. 
 22 Id. art. 175. 
 23 Id. arts. 290-91. 
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Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti or Committee for State 
Security); its investigators handle crimes that can be perceived 
as crimes perpetrated against the state as a whole, rather than 
a specific individual.  Namely, the FSB handles crimes such as 
contraband activity by state officials,24 and those involving 
terrorism25 and espionage.26  FSKN, on the other hand, 
handles investigations related to drug enforcement, specifically 
crimes relating to the possession, manufacture, or sale of 
drugs27 and drug p
Under the subject matter investigative jurisdiction, 
investigators of the procuracy handle crimes that are 
considered to pose the greatest threat to society, such as 
murder, kidnapping, and rape.29  These investigators are also 
responsible for a wide range of cases falling under their control 
through the personal jurisdiction exception to the subject 
matter investigative jurisdiction rules.30  Under personal 
jurisdiction, the procuracy is assigned investigations of people 
whose official immunity status entitles their investigations to 
greater oversight in the chain of command.  Individuals 
entitled to official immunity include members of the federation 
council (upper house of the legislature), state duma (lower 
house of the legislature), federal judges or jurors, procurators, 
investigators, lawyers, or the president of the Russian 
Federation.31  Procuracy investigators also handle 
investigations dealing with crimes committed by agents of the 
other investigative agencies that are related to their official 
duties.32 
 24 Id. art.188 [2]. 
 25 UK arts. 290-91. 
 26 Id. arts. 275-76, 283. 
 27 Id. arts. 228 [2], 228.1. 
 28 Id. art. 232 [2]. 
 29 SMIRNOV & KALINOVSKI, supra note 4, at 357 (citing UPK art. 151).  
Murder can be found in article 105 of the Criminal Procedure Code; 
kidnapping is defined in article 126; and rape is defined in article 131. 
 29 UPK art. 155[1][b]. 
 30 UPK art. 155 [1] [b]. 
 31 Following Law No.87-Ф3, approval of the head of the investigative 
committee under the procuracy of the Russian Federation is required for 
opening of criminal cases against individuals with highest form of official 
immunity.  See UPK arts. 447-48. 
 32 UPK art. 155 [1][c]. The only exception to procuracy’s personal 
  
2010] RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S LAW NO. 87-ФЗ 7 
 
Key exceptions to power granted by subject matter 
investigative jurisdiction include universal jurisdiction and 
alternative jurisdiction.  Through universal jurisdiction a 
procurator can withdraw any case from another agency’s 
jurisdiction and give it to a procuracy investigator.33  Through 
alternative jurisdiction, officials of any investigative branch 
can investigate a limited range of crimes uncovered during 
performance of their duties.34 
THE 2007 REFORMS 
The year 2007 was Vladimir Putin’s last year in power as 
the President of the Russian Federation and the year during 
which the election determining his successor was held.  The 
first major reforms in Russia’s Code of Criminal Procedure 
since the implementation of the 2001 Code also occurred in 
2007.  Law 87-Ф3 rearranged the division of functions between 
an investigator and a procurator during the preliminary 
investigation and created the investigative committee within 
the procuracy.  Signed in early June, the law was due to come 
into effect in ninety days.35 
Law 87-Ф3 takes the control over the preliminary 
investigation away from the procurator.36  The procurator’s 
consent to the opening of a criminal case has been limited to a 
right to refusal within twenty-four hours of receiving a 
resolution of the opening of the case, which is to be sent by the 
investigator immediately after opening.  Refusal can be made 
on the grounds that the opening of the case is illegal or that it 
is unsupported by evidence; there are no extensions of the 
jurisdiction concerns the above-mentioned types of individuals that are 
accused of espionage related crimes; those cases are assigned to FSB 
investigators. SMIRNOV & KALINOVSKI, supra note 4, at 359. 
 33 UPK art. 37[2][12]. 
 34 UPK art. 151[5] (governs alternative jurisdiction).  The range of crimes 
subject to this exception under the Criminal Code includes articles 158[3-4] 
and 159[2-4] (severe kinds of theft and fraud respectively); 172-74 (financial 
crimes); and 208-10 (relating to organized crime and banditry). 
 35 Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian 
Federation Collection of Legislation] 2007, No. 87, Item 3, available at 
http://www.consultant.ru/online/base/?req=doc;base=LAW;n=38313;p=2. 
 36 UPK art. 144, amended by SZ RF No. 87, Item 3 § 54. 
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twenty-four hour window.37  The procurator loses all input 
regarding the handling of the case by the investigator.  The 
procurator’s prior powers over the direction of the case, such as 
his consent of investigators’ petitions for actions requiring 
court authorizations, have been imputed to the head of the 
investigative body under law 87-Ф3.38  The only way a 
procurator can now influence the direction of the investigation 
is through a refusal to certify the investigator’s conclusion that 
the investigation is finished and the case is ready for trial.  
Upon such refusal, the case is sent back for further 
investigation.39 
Law 87-Ф3 also creates the investigative committee under 
the procuracy of the Russian Federation.  The investigative 
committee includes the hierarchy of investigative bodies within 
the procuracy.  Law 87-Ф3 strips the control over the 
preliminary investigation from the procurator and assigns it to 
the head of an investigative body.40  All decisions of an 
investigator regarding a preliminary investigation are subject 
to the approval of the head of the investigative body.  An 
investigator can appeal the head’s decisions to the head of the 
higher order investigative body.41  This schema is combined 
with the following facts: (a) the head of the hierarchy, the first 
assistant to the procurator general, is nominated by the 
president and can be appointed and removed only through 
legislation by the federation council, 42 (b) the first assistant 
will have full discretion over the appointment of his 
subordinates, and (c) the committee’s financial independence43 
makes the investigative committee a part of the procuracy in 
 37 UPK art. 146, amended by SZ RF No. 87, Item 3 § 56. 
 38 UPK art. 39, amended by SZ RF No. 87, Item 3 § 9. 
 39 UPK art. 146, amended by SZ RF No. 87, Item 3 § 56. 
 40 UPK art. 39, amended by SZ RF No. 87, Item 3 § 9. 
 41 UPK art. 146 [3]. 
 42 Ruslan Kadrmatov, Sledstvie Veli . . . Genprokuraturu RF Lishili 
Chasti Polnomchii ee Razdvoili [Investigation was Led by . . . The Procuracy 
of RF is Stripped from Some of Its Obligations and Is Split in Half], 
LENTA.RU, (Russ.), May 11, 2007, http://Lenta.ru/articles/2007/05/11/ 
sledstvie/. 
 43 Stephen Blank, The Putin Succession and Its Implications for Russian 
Politics, INST. FOR SECURITY & DEVELOPMENTALPOL’Y 19 (Feb. 2008), 
available at http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2008_blank_the 
-putin-succession-and-its-implications.pdf. 
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name, but an independent investigative agency in function.  
The only input that a procurator has into a preliminary 
investigation, aside from his ability to deny an investigator’s 
request to forward a case to trial, is through his oversight 
function as a guarantor of citizens’ rights.  This oversight has 
been greatly diminished since the procurator has lost all 
control over the course of the investigation.  Whenever the 
procurator is put on notice of the violation of a private party’s 
rights during an investigation, his or her only option is to 
notify the investigator of the violation and to appeal to the 
head of the investigative body if the investigator’s response is 
unsatisfactory.44  Appeals can be made all the way up to the 
procurator general, although a procurator must wait for an 
unsatisfactory response prior to appealing to the next ranking 
head. The only temporal limitation on a response to a 
procurator’s appeal is that it be made within a reasonable 
amount of time.45 
RAISON D’ETRE AND/OR POLITICS 
The legislation’s drastic impact on the criminal process in 
Russia, and the timing and speed with which it was 
implemented raised eyebrows in both Russian media and 
western academic press.46  Russia’s mainstream media was 
 44 UPK art. 37 [6]. 
 45 Aleksandr Aleksandrov, Zhivoi Ugolok: Uchenni Disput Pro 
Prokurorski Nadzor ei Sledstvenni Komitet [Live Corner: Academic Dispute 
over Procutorial Oversight and the Investigative Committee], Int’l Union of 
Assistance of Justice (Russ.), http://iuaj.net/modules.php?name=News&file 
=article&sid=372&mode=&order=0&thold=0 (last visited June 2, 2009). 
 46 The legislature first heard the law at the end of March with 
investigators stopping taking procurators orders by early September of the 
same year.  Kadrmatov, supra note 42.  Blank sees the creation of the 
committee as the “icing on the cake” of Kremlin elites’ machinations to 
preserve power during the elections.  Blank, supra note 43, at 23.  The 
legislation was set to take effect ninety days after passing.  See SZ RF No. 87, 
Item 3, available at http://www.consultant.ru/online/base/?req=doc;base= 
LAW;n=38313;p=2.  To determine whether this is eyebrow raising quick, 
contrast to the 2001 legislation that implemented all the changes in the 
newly rewritten Criminal Procedure Code, which was passed in December 
2001 and became effective on July 1, 2002 (around 180 days). SZ RF No. 177, 
Item 3, available at http://www.consultant.ru/online/base/?req=doc;base= 
LAW;n=70219No.p73.  The latter is a Russian Legal Database for the law 
that implemented the 2001 Code. 
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quick to point out that the legislation did not fully conform to 
the motivations underlying its existence.  Reform of the 
investigative process has been previously proposed, but such 
reform included the creation of a unified investigative service, 
one that would subsume the different agencies, such as MVD, 
FSB and FSKN, thus addressing the problems presented by 
their overlapping jurisdiction.   
While law 87-Ф3 was officially characterized as a first step 
towards such a service, by taking away procuratorial control 
over the opening and direction of criminal cases in the 
investigative agencies, it was essentially seen as playing a 
dividing, rather than a unifying function.  As a result, the 
investigative agencies saw a gain in independence rather than 
deferring additional control.47  Also, the official goal of putting 
a check on the procuracy’s control over both the investigative 
and the accusatory parts of the criminal process was perceived 
to be undermined by the legislation’s effect of freeing the 
investigations agencies of legal oversight by the procuracy and 
the inability of the courts to implement judicial oversight of 
their own.48  The commentators were further puzzled by the 
procurator general’s official support of the legislation despite 
its weakening the procuracy’s strength as an institution, and 
the widespread discontent within the procuracy.49  Due to the 
above inconsistencies, the mainstream media saw political 
considerations as being primary to the official explanations put 
forth by the administration and the legislature. 
Aleksandr Bastrykin, who was Putin’s university 
classmate, and who indeed became the head of the 
investigative committee, was seen as the primary candidate for 
the position.  With Bastrykin’s nomination came the realization 
that individuals with personal relations to Putin would be at 
the head of every one of Russia’s power structures, thus 
ensuring stability during the transfer to the new presidency.  
As the head of the investigative committee under the 
procuracy, Bastrykin joined Putin’s ex-FSB colleagues, Nicolai 
Patrushev and Victor Cherkesov, who headed the FSB and the 
FSKN respectively.  In addition, Putin’s university classmate 
 47 Kadrmatov, supra note 42. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
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Aleksey Anichin, headed the MVD, while Andrei Belianinov, 
Putin’s colleague at the KGB in East Germany, headed the 
Federal Customs Service.50 
Western academic publications that addressed law 87-Ф3’s 
raison d’etre (reason for being) also saw it as primarily 
politically motivated.  In Law as Politics: The Russian 
Procuracy and Its Investigative Committee, Ethan Burger and 
Mary Holland found the committee to be “a creature of politics, 
not law.”51  The authors saw Vladimir Putin, throughout his 
career, as one to use the procuracy as an instrument for 
consolidation of wealth and political power.  In a realm 
permeated with corruption, Putin has wielded the procuracy’s 
power to selectively prosecute regional politicians as 
enforcement of his drive to yoke Russia’s federal regions and 
municipalities under his power vertical (hierarchy of power 
under Putin).52  Similarly, the procuracy has been used to 
perform massive wealth transfers through nationalization and 
re-sale of illegal assets.  The authors saw the Yukos affair as 
the most notable example of this policy, where at the time, 
Russia’s richest man, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was imprisoned, 
when his company Yukos declared bankruptcy and its $100 
billion in assets resold to the highest bidder.53  In Burger’s and 
Holland’s opinion, the creation of the investigative committee 
and the naming of Aleksandr Bastrykin as its head was a move 
 50 Id. 
 51 Ethan Burger & Mary Holland, Law as Politics: The Russian 
Procuracy and Its Investigative Committee, 2 COLUM. J. E. EUR. L. 143, 185 
(2008). 
 52 “The procuracy selectively prosecuted corrupt officials whom the 
government disfavored.  Vladivostok’s former mayor fits this description, as 
does the mayor of Volgograd.  By contrast, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov is 
well placed enough that he has engaged in extremely questionable activities 
more than ten years without legal challenge.” Id. at 170 (internal citations 
omitted). 
 53 “The Yukos expropriation is especially important because the assets 
were so enormous; the Presidential Administration’s and procuracy’s methods 
against Yukos, its owners and employees, so severe; and the prosecutions 
have had such symbolic impact both in Russia and abroad. Former economic 
adviser, Andrei Illarionov, characterized the seizure and reselling of Yukos’ 
assets to Rosneft as ‘the biggest scam of 2006.’ He said, ‘This falls under the 
category of what people call the sale of stolen property.’  These actions 
against Yukos undermined property rights, discouraged investment and 
sparked capital flight.” Id. at 175. 
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that further streamlined the president’s control of the political 
investigations process by bypassing Yuri Chaika, the 
procurator general (i.e., the head of the procuracy).54 
In The Putin Succession and Its Implications for Russian 
Politics, Stephen Blank saw the decision to cut the procurator 
general out of the investigations process as a move motivated 
by power struggles within Kremlin’s siloviki clans.  Siloviki 
literally translates to “strongmen” and refers to heads of power 
structures, such as the investigative agencies and the 
procuracy that make up rival Kremlin clans.  Blank and other 
commentators saw the clans as an instance of a feudal system 
of power based on political patronage and control of rent-
generating governmental institutions.  Previously this system 
has been implemented through the workings of the Communist 
Party, and prior to that, through intrigue within the Tsar’s 
courts.  Succession has always been a problematic aspect of 
such systems, as it realigns the pyramid of power structured on 
personal patronage.55  According to Blank, Putin’s appointment 
of a loyal individual to head the investigative committee was 
Putin’s way to hedge and secure governmental positions within 
his successor Medvedev’s administration.  This move would 
insure that Putin and his appointees are protected from 
political ambitions of rival siloviki and potential threats of 
political investigation and prosecution.56 
THE VERIFIABILITY PRINCIPLE 
The Verifiability Principle holds that a statement is only 
meaningful if it is tautological or if it is empirically verifiable.57  
The key problem with political rationalizations, such as the 
ones presented for law 87-Ф3 above, is that without reliable 
sources of information, such as documents made public through 
the Freedom of Information Act in the United States, these 
rationalizations are more akin to axioms rather than empirical 
statements.  The political rationalizations described in this 
 54 Id. at 185. 
 55 Blank, supra note 43, at 3-8 
 56 Id. at 24-25. 
 57 Encyclopedia Britannica, Verifiability Principle, http://www.britannica 
.com/EBchecked/topic/626091/verifiability-principle (last visited May 4, 2009). 
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paper function as valid arguments only if their premises are 
assumed to be true.  Like the problem of evil in theology, where 
the presence of cruelty in the world can either be seen as 
logically inconsistent with the existence of God or, instead, as a 
necessary hardship provided by a benevolent deity to promote 
spiritual growth, the validity of such rationalizations can 
neither be confirmed nor denied through observation.  From 
some points of view, because law 87-Ф3 was passed in a 
climate of a siloviki struggle for the incumbent presidency, its 
raison d’etre must be necessarily connected to that struggle, 
with observations consistent with such a rationalization 
proving the point, and with contrary observations instead 
evidencing miscalculation on the behalf of the siloviki.  
Every observation supporting a political rationalization 
can be countered with an equally valid counter-observation.  
The Russian media’s speculation that the investigative 
committee’s formation headed by Aleksandr Bastrykin was 
motivated by Putin’s desire to stabilize the power structures 
through the installment of his university classmate58 can be 
countered by the destabilizing results of these events. Soon 
after taking control of the investigative committee, Aleksandr 
Bastrykin proceeded to make two high-profile arrests and 
detentions—that of General Bulbov,59 the right hand man to 
 58 The fact that Bastrykin was Putin’s university classmate is not 
indicative of anything in particular.  Chaika who’s authority under this 
theory Bastrykin was supposed to undercut can also be seen as connected to 
Putin, as it was reported that it was Putin then acting as Prime Minister who 
championed Chaika for the position of Minister of Justice in 2001 and later 
named him to the procurator General position as president in 2006.  Chaika, 
Yuriy, General’niy Prokuror Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Biographiya [Yuriy 
Chaika, General Procurator of Russian Federation, Biography], 
http://Lenta.ru/lib/14159398/ (last visited June 4, 2006) (Russ.). 
 59 Bulbov was arrested on October 2, 2007. Aleksandr Bulbov – 
Biography, http://Lenta.ru/lib/14184728/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2010) (Russ.).  
He was accused of numerous crimes including giving and receiving bribes (in 
violation of articles 290[4] and 291[2] of the Criminal Procedure Code 
respectively) and illegal wiretapping (in violation of article 138[2] of the 
Criminal Procedure Code).  Investigative Committee Under the Procuracy of 
the Russian Federation, Generalu Bulbovu Prediavleno Obvinenie v 
Okonchatelnoi Redactsii [General Bulbov is Presented with an Accusation in 
a Final Form], http://www.sledcomproc.ru/news/1123/ (last visited Sept. 20, 
2009) (Russ.).  The investigative committee had jurisdiction to investigate 
Bulbov under personal jurisdiction (article 155[1][c] of the Criminal 
Procedure Code) as it was investigating an official of an investigative agency 
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FSKN head Victor Cherkesov,60 and that of Sergey Storchak,61 
the Assistant Minister of finances.  The procuracy publicly 
questioned and opposed the arrests, both in the media and in 
the courts.62  In regards to the reaction by FSKN, Cherkesov 
publicly denounced his first general’s arrest and blew the 
whistle on the silovki’s struggle for power, which up until that 
point, no official had ever been publicly acknowledged.63 
for crimes committed when in performance of duties.  For more on personal 
jurisdiction of the investigative committee under the procuracy, see the 
Investigative Jurisdiction section of this paper. 
 60 Burger and Holland see this arrest, as well as the murder, of two 
individuals connected to the FSKN as payback by the FSB for FSKN’s 
involvement in the ‘three whales’ scandal during which high ranking FSB 
officials were implicated in smuggling and money laundering.  Burger & 
Holland, supra note 51, at 172, 186. 
 61 Storchak was arrested on November 15, 2007. Sergei Storchak - 
Biography, http://Lenta.ru/lib/14185567/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (Russ.). 
Storchak was charged with attempt to commit large-scale fraud falling under 
article 159[4] of the Criminal Code.  Under article 151[2][3] of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, this crime falls into the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
MVD. The investigative committee does not have personal jurisdiction per 
[2][1][b] of the same article as Storchak is not entitled to official immunity, or 
per [2][1][c] as Storchak is not an agent of an investigative agency or other 
agencies falling under the subsection.  The Committee could investigate 
Storchak under universal jurisdiction only if a procurator had officially 
transferred his case to it from the MVD, this is unlikely as the procuracy 
publicly opposed Storchak's arrest.  Consequently, the Committee must have 
acted under alternative jurisdiction (article 151[5] of the Criminal Procedure 
Code) since the fraud that Storchak was accused of committing falls under 
the range of crimes that can be investigated by any agency if it discovers it in 
performance of its duties.  For more on universal and alternative jurisdiction, 
refer to the Investigative Jurisdiction section of this paper. 
 62 In regards to both Bulbov and Storchak’s arrests, the procuracy filed 
petitions for dismissal. Burger & Holland, supra note 52, at 185-91; 
Aleksandr Aleksandrov, Zhivoi Ugolok: Mezhdu Tuchami ei Morem Gordo 
Reet Tov. Bulbov [Live Corner: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, Mr. Bulbov 
Stands Firm], 
http://iuaj103.valuehost.ru/modules.php?file=article&name=News&sid=340 
(last visted June 10, 2009). Furthermore, following the arrests, the procuracy 
relying on its function as the guarantor of citizens’ rights and overseer of the 
legality of the criminal process, launched a wide scale audit into investigative 
committee’s compliance with the law.  Burger & Holland, supra note 51, at 
188.  Burger and Holland along with Russian commentators see this audit as 
countermove in the procuracy’s struggle against the investigative committee. 
Id. 
 63 Victor Cherkesov, Warriors Must Not Turn into Traders, KOMMERSANT, 
Oct. 9, 2007, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=812840, 
translation available at http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2007/10/viktor_ 
cherkesov_on_the_spy_wa.htm. 
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If the Kremlin’s intent was to stabilize the relations 
between the power structures, then this scheme can be 
considered a failure, as the investigative committee’s actions 
saw an unraveling of an internal power struggle into a full-
blown war waged in the media, the courts and the streets. 
Burger and Holland consider the Bulbov and Storchak 
affairs as further proof of their thesis that “the Russian 
Presidential Administration under former President Vladimir 
Putin misused the procuracy for political purposes.”64  The 
Bulbov and Storchak affairs are addressed in detail and 
presented as continuations of the Kremlin’s use of criminal 
investigations for political purposes; yet, the details of these 
affairs evidence chaos rather than orchestrated manipulation 
for political gain.  In terms of institutional control, law 87-Ф3 is 
a destructive rather than a consolidating force.  The 
investigative organs of the various power structures no longer 
need the procuracy’s consent to open criminal cases; 
consequently these structures become significantly more 
independent in terms of their institutional actions. 
While it is true that through personal and universal 
jurisdiction exceptions the investigative committee remains the 
preferred tool for political investigation, its powers are still far 
from limitless, even after the enactment of law 87-Ф3.  For 
example, the procurator is still required to give consent before 
the investigative committee can exercise a universal 
jurisdiction over a case.65  Furthermore as a political weapon, 
the investigative committee will only give so much, as it is still 
up to the procuracy to prosecute the case in court.  As of the 
time of this writing, and approximately two years after their 
arrests, neither Storchak’s nor Bulbov’s cases have proceeded 
to the trial phase.66  This can be compared to Khodorkovsky, 
cited by Burger and Holland as an earlier victim of the 
Kremlin’s abuse of power, where Khodorkovsky was arrested, 
 64 Burger & Holland, supra note 51, at 143. 
 65 See UPK art. 37[2][12]; see also supra text in Investigative Jurisdiction 
section of this paper. 
 66 Storchak was arrested on November, 15, 2007.  Sergei Storchak – 
Biography, http://Lenta.ru/lib/14185567/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).  Bulbov 
was arrested on October 2, 2007. Aleksandr Bulbov – Biography, 
http://Lenta.ru/lib/14184728/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2010). 
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convicted and sentenced within a year and a half, under the 
supervision of a unified procuracy.67 If law 87-Ф3 functioned as 
designed, then the comparison works to undermine Burger and 
Holland’s thesis that it was implemented to streamline political 
investigations and prosecutions. 
The fact that law 87-Ф3 splits the previously united 
investigative and prosecutorial powers makes both the 
investigative committee and the procuracy a per se less-
effective political weapon than a unified procuracy.  By 
creating the investigative committee, law 87-Ф3 creates a new 
institutional player whose concerns need to be accommodated 
prior to its participation in the implementation of any political 
objective.  While this does not mean that law 87-Ф3 is indeed a 
creature of law rather than politics, its creation is far from an 
elegant fit into Burger’s and Holland’s thesis. 
As to Blank, his thesis suffers from the same problem.  In 
his paper, Blank refers to the creation of the Committee as the 
“icing on the cake” of Kremlin’s machinations, aimed at 
insuring the survival of vested players through the succession 
process: “[G]iven Bastrykin’s personal loyalty to Putin, it seems 
clear that Putin is manipulating the ‘power vertical’ to ensure 
that he and his appointments hold on to power in Medvedev 
period by upholding the threat of investigation and prosecution 
over all officials and politically interested personages.”68  
Considering law 87-Ф3’s effects on the Criminal Procedure 
Code, such a statement would have been more appropriate had 
the legislature started out with two divided institutions and 
fused them into the same organ under the control of Putin’s 
longtime colleague Procurator General Yuri Chaika.69  Given 
that the head of the investigative committee Bastrykin has no 
prosecution power whatsoever, it seems that Putin and his 
protectees would have been better hedged under Chaika’s 
supervision of a unified procuracy. 
 67 Khodorkovsky was arrested on October 25, 2003; on May 31, 2005, he 
was convicted and sentenced to nine years in prison. Mikhail Khodorkovsky – 
Biography, http://Lenta.ru/lib/14159417/full.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010). 
 68 Blank, supra note 43, at 24-25. 
 69 See infra text accompanying note 79. 
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PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Aside from politics and in terms of procedural innovation, 
law 87-Ф3 can be seen as another step in Russia’s transition 
from procuracy supervision to judicial oversight initiated by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and enshrined in the 2001 
Criminal Procedure Code.70  While law 87-Ф3 retains Article 
37’s provision that the procurator shall “exert supervision over 
the procedural activity of the bodies of inquiry and of the bodies 
for the preliminary investigation” as to preliminary 
investigations, this oversight loses any vestiges of judicial 
functions that it had retained from procuracy supervision 
under the Soviet model.  Specifically, the procurator can no 
longer determine the legality of an investigator’s action; he can 
only voice his objections and hope that they are considered in 
the investigative organ.   
While it is true that through this reform an involved party, 
such as a victim or suspect, loses a practical avenue to voice 
objections over the investigator’s actions, it nonetheless steers 
complaints towards the courts, which is the appropriate avenue 
for resolution of such disputes.  Considering the current 
accusatory functions of the procurator as well as historic 
functions of the procuracy within Russian society, a procurator 
is not capable of exercising true due diligence when arbitrating 
individual party appeals of investigators' actions.  This is 
because the procuracy objectives have been and are still 
intertwined with the objectives of the state.71  According to pre-
law 87-Ф3 statistics for 2007, courts remedied a greater 
fraction of involved parties’ complaints than the procurators.72  
The difference between the remedial proportions of the 
procurators and the courts is miniscule; procurators remedied 
every sixth objection filed by an individual party in regards to 
preliminary investigations, whereas the courts remedied every 
 70 See discussion supra section on The 2001 Code. 
 71 See SMIRNOV & KALINOVSKI, supra note 4, at 134.  For a western 
examination of the procuracy’s history as an instrument of the sovereign, see 
Jonathan Greenberg, The Kremlin’s Eye: The 21st Century Prokuratura in the 
Russian Authoritarian Tradition, 45 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2009). 
 72 Posting of Dr. Mikhail Silnov to Dura Lex Sed Lex, 
http://blogs.privet.ru/community/femida/49188298 (Nov. 4, 2008, 13:12 Russ. 
T.) (citing statistics from Supreme Court of the Russian Federation). 
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fifth.  Given the conditions in Russia, where the courts are still 
often overly deferential to the state,73 the proximity of the 
statistics is indicative of the lack of objectivity in the courts.  
Although this statistic is a problem, it is not suggestive by 
itself that the procurator is a more proper venue to remedy 
appeals brought by individual parties.74 
Law 87-Ф3 can also be seen as a step away from the 2001 
Code’s violation of the principle that holds that investigation 
and accusation should not be vested in the same body, ne 
procedat judex ex officio (one who investigates must not be the 
one to accuse).75  Under this principle, a prosecutor’s desire to 
obtain a conviction interferes with the impartial truth-finding 
functions of an investigator.  Russian commentators saw the 
procurator’s release from investigative functions as a method to 
allow a more efficient oversight of the propriety of investigators 
actions by exercising the right to deny certification to 
investigations deemed unwarranted.  In this sense, law 87-Ф3 
can overcome institutional biases that could have previously 
contributed to a procurator overlooking such improprieties.76 
The separation of powers can result in proper checks and 
balances that enable each to motivate the other to properly 
 73 Thaman, supra note 10, at 35; see also Yelina Kvurt, Selective 
Prosecution in Russia – Myth or Reality?, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 127 
(2007); Jeffrey Kahn, Vladimir Putin and the Rule of Law in Russia, 36 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 511 (2008). 
 74 Russian commentators point to the greater volume of appeals heard by 
procurators than courts, 521,480 to 43,903 in 2007 arguing that following 
Law No.87-Ф3 as the sole practical avenue for these complaints the courts 
will not be able to handle the same volume as the procurators. See Posting of 
Dr. Mikhail Silnov, supra note 76; SMIRNOV & KALINOVSKI, supra note 4, at 
134 (citing Obshestvenni Verdict [Public Verdict], June 28, 2007,  
http://control.hro.org/okno/pr/2007/06/28.php.). 
 75 Carlo Guarnieri, Judicial Education as a Support to Judicial 
Independence and Major Justice Reform, in THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON THE TRAINING OF THE JUDICIARY: JUDICIAL EDUCATION IN A 
WORLD OF CHALLENGE AND CHANGE (2004), available at www.nji.ca/nji/ 
internationalforum/Guarnieri.pdf.  This principle is implemented differently 
in various systems, for example, in France the prosecutor, upon finding 
serious presumptions that a crime has occurred, officially requests for the 
investigative judge to investigate it. See Bron Mckillop, Anatomy of a French 
Murder Case, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 527, 534-35 (1997). 
 76 A. Smirnov & K. Kalinovski, Komentari K UGOLOVNO-
PROSESSUALNOMU KODEKSU ROSSII, POSTATEINI, [Per Statute, Commentary to 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE OF RUSSIA] 134 (2008) (Russ.). 
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perform their functions.  Commentators have criticized 
procurators for the low quality of cases presented in court.77  
This is often caused by poor investigations that are enabled by 
sympathetic trial courts that produce convictions regardless of 
the sufficiency of the evidence.78  As far as these problems are 
caused by the intermingling of the investigative, the 
prosecutorial, and the judicial branches, law 87-Ф3 appears to 
be a proper remedial step.   
As it were, the three branches could not properly check 
each other if the procurator identifies with the investigator and 
the courts identify with the procurator.  These cross 
identifications would not have ceased while the procurator 
performed both investigative and judicial functions.  By 
segregating the prosecution from the investigation (i.e., 
eliminating the procurator’s control over investigation of 
criminal cases), and by eliminating the procurator’s vestigial 
judicial functions (i.e., procurator’s power to determine the 
legality of an investigation), law 87-Ф3 sets up a system that is 
capable of proper functioning.  However, this reform, even if 
properly implemented, will not be sufficient to produce a 
prosecutorial service comparable to western standards.  The 
procuracy’s reliance on its ability to re-open poorly investigated 
cases in perpetuity as well as its reliance on the judiciary’s 
eagerness to overturn acquittals will also need to be separately 
addressed.79 
Finally, the obvious can also be stated: no reform will truly 
be successful until Russia’s flagrant and pervasive corruption 
is somehow mitigated to some degree.  Criminal investigation 
is not only a tool used by the politically powerful, but a way to 
promote various business interests ranging from giant to small 
businesses:  from backwoods villages to the centers of power, a 
criminal case opening that was “contracted for,” remains as a 
common business expense in dealing with unwanted 
 77 See Thaman, supra note 10, at 370-72 n.103; see also GREENBERG, 
supra note 2, at 22 (citing Stanislaw Pomorski, Modern Russian Criminal 
Procedure: The Adversarial Principle and Guilty Plea, 17 CRIM. L.F. 129, 147 
(2006)). 
 78 See Thaman, supra note 10, at 370-72 n.103. 
 79 For an in depth analysis of the Russian practices of vacating from trial 
and re-opening of poorly investigated cases as well of overturning acquittals 
based on procedural errors committed during the investigation, see id. at 357. 
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competition.80  Such competition is eliminated when 
competitors are placed into preliminary detention upon the 
opening of criminal cases against them.81  In some ways law 
87-Ф3 can be seen as impeding this process on its own by 
increasing the scope of actors that need to be on the take. 82  
Accordingly, the Russian media has speculated that the conflict 
between the procuracy and the investigative committee is over 
the splitting of the “pie,” rather than the underlying political 
machinations.83  It must also be pointed out that the 2001 
Code’s decision to bring in procurator’s consent to criminal case 
openings was also argued as motivated by anti-corruption 
considerations—to curb “contracted for” case openings.  The 
procuracy claimed that such consent was responsible for up to 
a 10% reduction in baseless case initiation. 84 
CONCLUSION 
Without access to reliable sources of information, 
speculations about the political origins of law 87-Ф3 can never 
be confirmed nor denied.  Closer to unverifiable axioms than to 
empirical propositions, such speculations are of limited 
academic use.  However, if examined procedurally, then law 87-
Ф3 is consistent with a series of post-Soviet reforms moving 
Russian procedure closer to modern adversarial principles 
embraced in the West.  As such, law 87-Ф3 can be conceived of 
as a remedy towards systemic Russian ills, including inept 
preliminary investigation and biased judiciary.  Whether or not 
law 87-Ф3 can be considered a success will only be determined 
over time.  For now, its success will likely depend on 
introduction of concurrent reforms designed to make it harder 
to re-open cases and appeal acquittals and to mitigate systemic 
corruption in Russia. 
 
 80 See Sergei Mihalich, Nadzor Na Oba Vashi Doma [Oversight over Both 
of Your Houses], NOVAYA GAZETA (Russ.), Dec. 20, 2007, 
http://www.Novayagazeta.ru/data/2007/97/13.html. 
81 See id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id 
 84 Burnham & Kahn, supra note 6, at 10-11. 
